dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor.author
Moskalenko, Anna
dc.date.accessioned
2018-03-08T16:28:29Z
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-10T13:36:01Z
dc.date.available
2018-03-08T16:28:29Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-10T13:36:01Z
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/306516
dc.description.abstract
Abstract Political parties are increasingly adopting more inclusive candidate selection
methods by introducing primary elections. This paper identi es motives of this change,
as well as decision makers leading to this introduction. We view a party as a coalition
of factions, composed by a party elite and a dissenting faction. By developing a game-
theoretical model of interplay between the party elite and the dissenting faction, we fi nd
that the primaries are introduced in two scenarios: (1) when the party elite fi nd itself
in a weak position under the credible threat of the dissidents to leave the party and (2)
when there is a high cohesion between both factions and the party elite itself takes the
initiative in introducing primaries.
Keywords: Political parties, Primaries, Party split, Party factions, Candidate selection,
intra-party politics.
JEL Classi fication Number: D71, D72
eng
dc.format.extent
27 p.
cat
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2017-19
dc.rights
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.source
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.subject.other
Partits polítics
cat
dc.subject.other
Eleccions primàries
cat
dc.title
How public perception towards party (dis)unity a ects the introduction of primaries
cat
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
cat
dc.rights.accessLevel
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess