dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.contributor.author |
Osório, António (António Miguel) |
dc.date.accessioned |
2018-06-07T13:20:11Z |
dc.date.available |
2018-06-07T13:20:11Z |
dc.date.created |
2017-10-25 |
dc.date.issued |
2018 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/321559 |
dc.format.extent |
16 p. |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.publisher |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2018-19 |
dc.rights |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
dc.source |
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya) |
dc.subject.other |
Disseny d'experiments |
dc.subject.other |
Economia del benestar |
dc.subject.other |
Decisió de grup |
dc.title |
A Behavioral Theory of Allocation in the Dictator Game |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.subject.udc |
33 - Economia |
dc.embargo.terms |
cap |
dc.rights.accessLevel |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.description.abstract |
This paper attempts to explain the behavior observed in the dictator game without
explicitly assuming a utility function. Alternatively, I consider the representative behavior
of a society composed of heterogeneous individuals in terms of altruism and self-interest.
Based on these two principles, I present an allocation that aggregates the society's preferences.
The result depends crucially on the value of the resource under dispute for the
dictator. Even if the value of the resource is extremely important for the dictator, the
dictator cannot justify a share of the resource larger than 3/4 of the total. An allocation
proposing more than this share of the resource cannot reach social consensus. On the
other extreme, if the value of the resource is sufficiently unimportant for the society, an
equal split of the resource emerges in the limit.
Keyword: Dictator Game; Allocation Rules; Altruism; Self-interest; Conflict Resolution.
JEL classifi cation: C91, D03, D63, D74. |