Competition with forward contracts : a laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design

Author

Brandts, Jordi

Pezanis-Christou, Paul

Schram, Arthur

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica

Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica

Publication date

2006

Abstract

We use experiments to study the efficiency effects for a market as a whole of adding the possibility of forward contracting to a pre-existing spot market. We deal separately with the cases where spot market competition is in quantities and where it is in supply functions. In both cases we compare the effect of adding a contract market with the introduction of an additional competitor, changing the market structure from a triopoly to a quadropoly. We find that, as theory suggests, for both types of competition the introduction of a forward market significantly lowers prices. The combination of supply function competition with a forward market leads to high efficiency levels.

Document Type

Working paper

Language

English

Subjects and keywords

Empreses elèctriques

Publisher

 

Related items

Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica / Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). Working papers ;

Rights

open access

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https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/

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