dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor.author
Dahm, Matthias
dc.contributor.author
Dur, Robert
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Glazerz, Amihai
dc.date.accessioned
2010-02-23T18:33:06Z
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-10T13:32:04Z
dc.date.available
2010-02-23T18:33:06Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-10T13:32:04Z
dc.identifier.issn
1988 - 0812
dc.identifier.other
T - 2121 - 2009
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/43869
dc.description.abstract
A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority of districts suffer from adoption of the program. When votes reveal information about the district, the firm's implicit promise or threat can be credible.
cat
dc.format.extent
400603 bytes
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application/pdf
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2009-22
dc.rights
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/)
cat
dc.subject.other
Vot -- Investigació
ca
dc.subject.other
Política pública
ca
dc.subject.other
Grups de pressió
ca
dc.subject.other
Política -- Aspectes socials
ca
dc.subject.other
Empreses -- Aspectes polítics
ca
dc.title
Lobbying of Firms by Voters
ca
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
ca
