dc.contributor.author
Alcalde, José
dc.contributor.author
Pérez Castrillo, David
dc.contributor.author
Romero Medina, Antonio
dc.identifier
https://ddd.uab.cat/record/220847
dc.identifier
urn:10.1006/jeth.1997.2447
dc.identifier
urn:oai:ddd.uab.cat:220847
dc.identifier
urn:articleid:10957235v82n2p469
dc.identifier
urn:recercauab:ARE-4767
dc.identifier
urn:oai:egreta.uab.cat:publications/ee33daa4-dc84-499a-ac49-9312254c1b60
dc.identifier
urn:scopus_id:0008872310
dc.identifier
urn:wos_id:000076863000009
dc.description.abstract
Altres ajuts: DGCYT/PB 92-0590
dc.description.abstract
Altres ajuts: DGCYT/PB 94-1504
dc.description.abstract
We implement the stable correspondence of a job matching market in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. We use a simple sequential mechanism in which firms propose a salary to each worker (first stage) and, then, each worker accepts at most one proposal (second stage). Moreover, if agents' preferences are additive, this mechanism implements in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium the firms' optimal correspondence when firms use undominated strategies. Finally, we construct another simple sequential mechanism where the order of decisions is permuted and which implements the workers' optimal correspondence when agents' preferences are additive.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.relation
Journal of economic theory ; Vol. 82 Núm. 2 (octubre 1998), p. 469-480
dc.rights
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dc.rights
https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.title
Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
