dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor.author
Ferré Carracedo, Montserrat
dc.contributor.author
Manzano, Carolina
dc.date.accessioned
2008-04-07T18:10:57Z
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-10T13:30:41Z
dc.date.available
2008-04-07T18:10:57Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-10T13:30:41Z
dc.identifier.issn
1988 - 0812
dc.identifier.other
T - 1887 - 2007
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/5317
dc.description.abstract
Central banks often intervene secretly in the foreign exchange market. This secrecy
seems to be at odds with the signalling channel. In this article we will analyse when
a central bank intervening in the foreign exchange rate market purely through the
signalling channel would prefer to act secretly or publicly. By using a microstructure model, we will show that the consistency of the intervention with fundamentals, the volume of noise trading, the weight given to the effectiveness of intervention and the degree of superior information held by the central bank will influence the decision to intervene secretly or publicly. Keywords: foreign exchange intervention, market microstructure. JEL Classifi cation: D82, E58, F31, G14.
cat
dc.format.extent
388774 bytes
dc.format.mimetype
application/pdf
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2007-07
dc.rights
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/)
cat
dc.subject.other
Canvi exterior
ca
dc.subject.other
Mercat exterior
ca
dc.subject.other
Bancs centrals
ca
dc.title
When do central banks prefer to intervene secretly?
ca
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
ca
