dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor.author
Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel
dc.contributor.author
Sudhölter, Peter
dc.contributor.author
Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia
dc.date.accessioned
2023-06-06T07:10:37Z
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-10T13:27:56Z
dc.date.available
2023-06-06T07:10:37Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-10T13:27:56Z
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/535076
dc.description.abstract
A non-negative transferable utility (TU) game is average monotonic if there
exists a non-negative allocation according to which the relative worth is not
decreasing when enlarging the coalition. We generalize this definition to the
nontransferable utility (NTU) case. It is shown that an average monotonic
NTU game shares several properties with an average monotonic TU game.
In particular it has a special core element and there exists a population
monotonic allocation scheme. We show that an NTU bankruptcy game is
average monotonic with respect to the claims vector.
Keywords: nontransferable utility; average monotonicity; core; population
monotonicity
JEL classification: C71
eng
dc.format.extent
14 p.
cat
dc.publisher
ECO-SOS, Centre de Recerca en Economia i Sostenibilitat
cat
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2022-05
dc.rights
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.source
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.subject.other
Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
cat
dc.title
Average monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility
cat
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
cat
dc.rights.accessLevel
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
