Input design for active detection of integrity attacks using set-based approach

Other authors

Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Doctorat en Automàtica, Robòtica i Visió

Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament d'Enginyeria de Sistemes, Automàtica i Informàtica Industrial

Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. SAC - Sistemes Avançats de Control

Publication date

2020

Abstract

© 2020. The Authors


This paper presents the design of an input sequence in order to actively guarantee detectabilityof integrity attacks. The design of the input sequence is formulated as an optimization problemwhere the performance degradation imposed in the protected system is minimized whileguaranteeing attack detectability by separating the reachable sets of the system in healthyand attacked operation. By considering uncertainties bounded by zonotopes, the design of anoptimal open-loop input sequence such that guarantee the separability of the reachable zonotopicsets can be computed by solving a Mixed Integer Quadratic Program (MIQP). Following thisapproach, attack detection can be guaranteed by: I) forcing a distinct behavior of the systemoutputs; II) ensuring that residuals under attack will exit the healthy residual set. Furthermore,the present work also considers the imposition of residuals detectability for the specific replayattack scenario affecting an state estimate control system. The effectiveness of the proposals isvalidated in simulation by means of a numerical example.


This work has been partially funded by AGAUR ACCIO RIS3CAT UTILITIES 4.0 – P7 SECUTIL


Peer Reviewed


Postprint (author's final draft)

Document Type

Conference report

Language

English

Related items

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405896320305310

info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ACCIO/RIS3CAT/SECUTIL

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Rights

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/

Open Access

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain

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E-prints [72986]