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Title:
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Brownian Signals: Information Quality, Quantity and Timing in Repeated Games
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Author:
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Osório, António (António Miguel)
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Other authors:
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Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia; Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
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Abstract:
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This paper examines different Brownian information structures for varying time
intervals. We focus on the non-limit case and on the trade-offs between information
quantity and quality to efficiently establish incentives. These two dimensions of information tend to complement each other when signals quality is sufficiently high.
Otherwise, information quantity tends to replace information quality. Any conclusion
depends crucially on the rate at which information quality improves or decays with
respect to the discounting incentives.
JEL: C73, D82, D86.
KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Information Quantity, Information Quality. |
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Publication date:
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2015 |
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Subject (UDC):
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33 - Economia |
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Subject(s):
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Jocs, Teoria de
Teoria de la informació (Economia)
Contractes -- Aspectes econòmics |
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Rights:
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L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
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Pages:
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12 p. |
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Document type:
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Working Paper |
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Published by:
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Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
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Collection:
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Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-32
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