In ordinary critical practice, we take for granted that we can learn from fictions (literary or visual), i.e., that we can acquire new warranted beliefs on that basis. Thus, we assume that realist fictions include truths about the settings in which the fictional events occur, intended as such, and often backed by serious research. This makes understandable Salman Rushdie's criticism of the film Slumdog Millionaire that it "piles impossibility on impossibility" [Guardian, 24/02/2009], given the realist ambitions of the film. We similarly assume that we can acquire experiential knowledge -knowledge of what it is like- and knowledge-how from fictions, whether or not they differ from propositional knowledge. Even the most fantastic fictions invite readers to assume truths -say, about human psychology in Alice in Wonderland, to make sense of the behavior of the characters she meets and her interactions with them. But can this be philosophically justified? In the following introductory pages to this special issue of Teorema devoted to the topic, I'll mention some strands of the most significant recent discussions that frame the papers to be found in it, and I'll provide short summaries of these contributions.