To access the full text documents, please follow this link: http://hdl.handle.net/10256/15137

Title:	Stability and voting by committees with exit
Author:	Berga, Dolors; Bergantiños Cid, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro
Abstract:	We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà et al. 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying founder's sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society
Subject(s):	-Vot -Voting -Eleccions -Elections
Rights:	Tots els drets reservats
Document type:	Article Article - Submitted version peer-reviewed
Published by:	Springer Verlag
Share:

Show full item record