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Título:	Optimality and distortionary lobbying: regulating tobacco consumption
Autor/a:	Colombo, Luca; Galmarini, Umberto
Notas:	We examine policies directed at regulating tobacco consumption through three types of instruments: (i) an excise tax hindering consumption by increasing the price of cigarettes, (ii) prevention programs helping consumers to make choices that are more time consistent when trading-off the current pleasure from smoking and its future health harms, and (iii) smoking bans directly restricting consumption. First, on normative grounds, we focus on the optimal design of public policies maximizing the economy’s surplus. Second, in a positive perspective, we investigate how the lobbying activities of the tobacco industry, of smokers, and of anti-tobacco organizations may distort government intervention.
Materia(s):	-Hàbit de fumar -Impostos especials -Tobbacco hàbit -Excise tax
Derechos:	cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Colombo et al., 2015 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
Tipo de documento:	Documento de trabajo
Editor:	Institut d’Economia de Barcelona
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