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Títol:
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Can lower tax rates be bought? Business rent-seeking and tax competition among U.S. States
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Autor/a:
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Chirinko, Robert S.; Wilson, Daniel J.
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Notes:
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The standard model of strategic tax competition assumes that government policymakers are perfectly benevolent. We depart from this assumption by allowing policymakers to be influenced by the rent-seeking behavior of businesses. Campaign contributions may affect tax competition and enhance or retard the mobility of capital across jurisdictions. Based on a panel of 48 U.S. states and unique data on business campaign contributions, we find that contributions have a significant direct effect on tax policy, the economic value of a $1 business campaign contribution is nearly $4, the slope of the tax reaction function is negative, and the empirical results are sensitive to state effects. |
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Matèries:
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-Campanyes electorals
-Anàlisi de dades de panel
-Política fiscal
-Political campaigns
-Panel analysis
-Fiscal policy |
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Drets:
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cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Chirinko et al., 2010
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
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Tipus de document:
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Document de treball |
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Publicat per:
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Institut d’Economia de Barcelona
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Compartir:
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