Para acceder a los documentos con el texto completo, por favor, siga el siguiente enlace: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116977

Título:	Soft budgets and local borrowing regulation in a dynamic decentralized leadership model with saving and free mobility
Autor/a:	Akai, Nobuo; Sato, Motohiro
Notas:	This paper considers a simple dynamic decentralized leadership model with local borrowing and regional productivity enhancing investment. The central government is benevolent but cannot commit. The local governments strategically act while accounting for the ex post motive of the central government. We then investigate inefficiency in the subgame perfect equilibrium. We analyze the effect of central control on local borrowings. It is revealed that the central control is of no use. The model is extended to the case with residential mobility which gives different policy implications.
Materia(s):	-Inversions -Administració local -Investments -Local government
Derechos:	cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Akai et al., 2009 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
Tipo de documento:	Documento de trabajo
Editor:	Institut d’Economia de Barcelona
Compartir:

Mostrar el registro completo del ítem