dc.contributor.author
Leino, Päivi
dc.contributor.author
Saarenheimo, Tuomas
dc.date.issued
2018-09-18T09:28:55Z
dc.date.issued
2018-09-18T09:28:55Z
dc.identifier
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/35454
dc.description.abstract
The dominant narrative presents the Economic and Monetary Union as an incomplete structure which, to operate stably, needs to be supplemented by a deeper fiscal integration. We study the general features of the recent proposals for a fiscal stabilisation mechanism, intended to smooth the effects of asymmetric shocks on Member States, from a multi-disciplinary viewpoint, combining economic, legal and political analyses. While possible to construct within the current Treaties, we find the proposals economically and politically fragile, and likely to be unenforceable. Our gravest concern however relates to the envisaged broad macroeconomic conditionality, which is largely unconnected to the stability aims of the mechanism but has potential to undermine the democratic legitimacy of some of the Member States’ most foundational societal choices.
dc.description.abstract
The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.relation
ADEMU Working Paper Series;95
dc.relation
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/649396
dc.rights
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium provided that the original work is properlyattributed.
dc.rights
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject
Economic and Monetary Union
dc.subject
Fiscal federalism
dc.subject
Fiscal stabilization
dc.subject
EU political integration
dc.title
A fiscal union for the EMU?
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
