dc.contributor
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.contributor.author
Garoupa, Nuno
dc.date.issued
2017-07-26T10:50:56Z
dc.date.issued
2017-07-26T10:50:56Z
dc.date.issued
2000-04-01
dc.date.issued
2017-07-23T02:05:12Z
dc.identifier
https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=454
dc.identifier
European Economic Review, 45, 9, (2001) pp. 1765-1771
dc.identifier
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/691
dc.description.abstract
The economic literature on crime and punishment focuses on
the trade-off between probability and severity of punishment,
and suggests that detection probability and fines are
substitutes. In this paper it is shown that, in presence of
substantial underdeterrence caused by costly detection and
punishment, these instruments may become complements. When
offenders are poor, the deterrent value of monetary sanctions
is low. Thus, the government does not invest a lot in
detection. If offenders are rich, however, the deterrent value
of monetary sanctions is high, so it is more profitable to
prosecute them.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.relation
Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 454
dc.rights
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject
probability and severity of sanctions
dc.subject
law enforcement
dc.subject
Business Economics and Industrial Organization
dc.title
Optimal magnitude and probability of fines
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
