dc.contributor.author
Frug, Alexander
dc.date.accessioned
2025-10-23T15:56:07Z
dc.date.available
2025-10-23T15:56:07Z
dc.date.issued
2025-10-21T16:28:45Z
dc.date.issued
2025-10-21T16:28:45Z
dc.date.issued
2025-10-21T16:28:44Z
dc.identifier
Frug A. When half a boycott makes a winner: on Eurovision voting. Econ Lett. 2025;256:112639. DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112639
dc.identifier
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/71615
dc.identifier
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112639
dc.identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/10230/71615
dc.description.abstract
Boycotts are meant to isolate. A pushback -however small- is almost always inevitable. In settings with many alternatives, boycott tends to be diffuse, while counter-support is concentrated. This asymmetry can translate into a great advantage for the boycotted party.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.relation
Economics Letters. 2025;256:112639
dc.rights
© 2025 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject
Coordination failure
dc.title
When half a boycott makes a winner: on Eurovision voting
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
