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Título:	Regulating Concessions of Toll Motorways, An Empirical Study on Fixed vs. Variable Term Contracts
Autor/a:	Albalate, Daniel, 1980-; Bel i Queralt, Germà, 1963-; Fageda, Xavier, 1975-
Abstract:	Recent theoretical developments on concession contracts for long term infrastructure projects under uncertain demand show the benefits of allowing for flexible term contracts rather than fixing a rigid term. This study presents a simulation to compare both alternatives by using real data from the oldest Spanish toll motorway. For this purpose, we analyze how well the flexible term would have performed instead of the fixed length actually established. Our results show a huge reduction of the term of concession that would have dramatically decreased the firm’s benefits and the user’s overpayment due to the internalization of an unexpected traffic increase.
Materia(s):	-Concessions administratives -Autopistes -Política de transports -Infraestructures (Transport) -Privatització -Control de gestió -Concessions -Express highways -Transportation and state -Transportation buildings -Privatization -Management audit
Derechos:	cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Albalate et al., 2007 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
Tipo de documento:	Documento de trabajo
Editor:	Universitat de Barcelona. Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública
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