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Title:	An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game
Author:	Atay, Ata
Other authors:	Universitat de Barcelona
Abstract:	Solymosi and Raghavan (2001) characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. Their proof makes use of some graphtheoretical tools, while the present proof relies on the notion of buyer-seller exact representative in Núñez and Rafels (2002)
Subject(s):	-Teoria de jocs -Assignació de recursos -Àlgebres de Von Neumann -Problema de Neumann -Game theory -Resource allocation -Von Neumann algebras -Neumann problema
Rights:	cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Atay , 2016 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
Document type:	Working Paper
Published by:	Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
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