Resource allocation with warranties in claims problems

Autor/a

Giménez Gómez, José M. (José Manuel)

Peris, Josep E.

Solís Baltodano, María José

Otros/as autores/as

Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia

Fecha de publicación

2017



Resumen

The establishing of warranties in order to ensure some minimum awards to each agent involved in an allocation (claims) problem has been analyzed in the body of literature by introducing lower bounds. When focusing on claims problems, four main lower bounds on awards have been de ned: the minimal right (Curiel et al., 1987), the fair lower bound (Moulin, 2002), securement (Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2004) and the min lower bound (Dominguez, 2013). The current approach analyzes the e ect of requiring the aforementioned lower bounds in an allocation mechanism. We compare the mechanisms thus obtained together with the use of some additional properties. By doing so, we show that there is a correspondence between lower bounds and claims rules, i.e., associated to each particular lower bound, we nd a particular claims rule. Consequently, we provide new characterizations for the constrained equal awards rule, as well as the Ibn Ezra proposal. Finally, a dual analysis, by using upper bounds in awards, provides characterizations of the dual rules of the previous ones: the constrained equal losses rule and the dual of the Ibn Ezra rule. Keywords: Claims problems, Warranties, Lower bounds, Claims rules JEL classifi cation: C71, D63, D71.

Tipo de documento

Documento de trabajo

Lengua

Inglés

Materias CDU

33 - Economía

Palabras clave

Economia

Páginas

27 p.

Publicado por

Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública

Colección

Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia; 2017-12

Documentos

DT.12-2017_Gimenez_Peris_Solis.pdf

444.5Kb

 

Derechos

L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

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