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dc.contributor.author | Berga, Dolors |
---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Bergantiños Cid, Gustavo |
dc.contributor.author | Massó, Jordi |
dc.contributor.author | Neme, Alejandro |
dc.date | 2018-03-13T09:10:54Z |
dc.date | 2018-03-13T09:10:54Z |
dc.date | 2007-09-01 |
dc.identifier.citation | 0165-4896 |
dc.identifier.citation | 008195 |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10256/15139 |
dc.format | application/pdf |
dc.language.iso | eng |
dc.publisher | Elsevier |
dc.relation | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.03.004 |
dc.relation | Versió preprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.03.004 |
dc.relation | © Mathematical social sciences, 2007, vol. 54, núm. 2, p. 152-175 |
dc.relation | Articles publicats (D-EC) |
dc.rights | Tots els drets reservats |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.subject | Equilibri (Economia) |
dc.subject | Equilibrium (Economics) |
dc.subject | Vot |
dc.subject | Voting |
dc.subject | Jocs, Teoria de |
dc.subject | Game theory |
dc.subject | Elecció social |
dc.subject | Social choice |
dc.title | An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersion |
dc.type | peer-reviewed |
dc.description.abstract |