Political connections and informed trading: evidence from TARP

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dc.contributor.author	Akın, Özlem
dc.contributor.author	Coleman, Nicholas S.
dc.contributor.author	Fons‐Rosen, Christian
dc.contributor.author	Peydró, José-Luis
dc.date	2019
dc.identifier.citation	Akin O, Coleman NS, Fons‐Rosen C, Peydró J‐L. Political connections and informed trading: evidence from TARP. Financ Manage. 2019 Sep 3:1-48. DOI: 10.1111/fima.12292
dc.identifier.citation	0046-3892
dc.identifier.citation	https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12292
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10230/43201
dc.format	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Wiley
dc.relation	Financ Manage. 2019 Sep 3:1-48. DOI: 10.1111/fima.12292
dc.relation	info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/648398
dc.relation	info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/ECO2014-55555-P
dc.relation	info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/ECO2015-68182-P
dc.rights	This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Akin O, Coleman NS, Fons‐Rosen C, Peydró J‐L. Political connections and informed trading: evidence from TARP. Financ Manage. 2019 Sep 3:1-48, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12292. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
dc.subject	Political connections
dc.subject	Political economy in banking
dc.subject	Insider trading
dc.subject	TARP
dc.subject	Bank bailouts
dc.title	Political connections and informed trading: evidence from TARP
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.description.abstract	We study insider trading behavior surrounding the largest bank bailout in history: TARP. In politically‐connected banks, insider buying during the pre‐TARP period is associated with increases in abnormal returns around bank‐specific TARP announcement; for unconnected banks, trading and returns are uncorrelated. Results hold across insiders within the same bank and are stronger for finance‐related government connections. Through a FOIA request we obtained the previously undisclosed TARP funds requested; the ratio of received to requested funds correlates both with abnormal returns and insider buying behavior in connected banks.
dc.description.abstract	Christian Fons‐Rosen acknowledges financial support by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (ECO2014–55555–P).José‐Luis Peydró acknowledges financial support from both ECO2015‐68182‐P (MINECO/FEDER, UE) and the European Research Council Grant (project 648398).

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