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Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues

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Author

Dutta, Bhaskar

Massó, Jordi

Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues

Publication date

1997

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Abstract

Altres ajuts: DGICYT/PB92-0590

Altres ajuts: CIRIT/GRQ93-2044

In the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market (the institutions) can each be matched to a set of agents (the individuals) on the other side of the market, and the individuals only have preferences defined over institutions to which they can be matched. We explicitly study the consequences for stability when the composition of one's coworkers or colleagues can affect the preferences over institution.

Document Type

Article

Language

English

Subjects and keywords

Jocs, Teoria de; Matching model

Publisher

 

Related items

Journal of economic theory ; Núm. 75 (1997), p. 464-475

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open access

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Articles escrits per personal UAB o publicats per la universitat [88076]