dc.contributor.author
Dutta, Bhaskar
dc.contributor.author
Massó, Jordi
dc.contributor.author
Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
dc.identifier
https://ddd.uab.cat/record/143269
dc.identifier
urn:10.1006/jeth.1997.2291
dc.identifier
urn:oai:ddd.uab.cat:143269
dc.identifier
urn:articleid:10957235n75p464
dc.identifier
urn:recercauab:ARE-4507
dc.identifier
urn:scopus_id:0000132827
dc.identifier
urn:wos_id:A1997XT95700009
dc.identifier
urn:oai:egreta.uab.cat:publications/258a7fbf-dcf9-4310-82f1-44a1d7e6a115
dc.description.abstract
Altres ajuts: DGICYT/PB92-0590
dc.description.abstract
Altres ajuts: CIRIT/GRQ93-2044
dc.description.abstract
In the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market (the institutions) can each be matched to a set of agents (the individuals) on the other side of the market, and the individuals only have preferences defined over institutions to which they can be matched. We explicitly study the consequences for stability when the composition of one's coworkers or colleagues can affect the preferences over institution.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.relation
Journal of economic theory ; Núm. 75 (1997), p. 464-475
dc.rights
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dc.rights
https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subject
Jocs, Teoria de
dc.subject
Matching model
dc.title
Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
