dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor.author
Tomori, Françeska
dc.contributor.author
Ansink, Erik
dc.contributor.author
Houba, Harold
dc.contributor.author
Hagerty, Nick
dc.contributor.author
Bos, Charles
dc.date.accessioned
2023-05-31T06:32:55Z
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-10T13:28:46Z
dc.date.available
2023-05-31T06:32:55Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-10T13:28:46Z
dc.date.created
2021-01-31
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/534854
dc.description.abstract
We estimate market power in California’s thin water market. Market frictions may
distort the potential welfare gains from water marketing. We use a Nash-Cournot
model and derive a closed-form solution for the extent of market power in a typical
water market setting. We then use this solution to estimate market power in a newly
assembled dataset on California’s water economy. We show that, under the assumptions
of the Cournot model, market power in this thin market is limited.
Keywords: Water markets, Market power, California, Cournot-Nash.
JEL classification: C72, D43, Q25
eng
dc.format.extent
35 p.
cat
dc.publisher
ECO-SOS, Centre de Recerca en Economia i Sostenibilitat
cat
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2021-01
dc.rights
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.source
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.subject.other
Aigua--Preus
cat
dc.title
Market power in California’s water market
cat
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
cat
dc.rights.accessLevel
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
