Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
2021
We estimate market power in California’s thin water market. Market frictions may distort the potential welfare gains from water marketing. We use a Nash-Cournot model and derive a closed-form solution for the extent of market power in a typical water market setting. We then use this solution to estimate market power in a newly assembled dataset on California’s water economy. We show that, under the assumptions of the Cournot model, market power in this thin market is limited. Keywords: Water markets, Market power, California, Cournot-Nash. JEL classification: C72, D43, Q25
English
338 - Economic situation. Economic policy. Management of the economy. Economic planning. Production. Services. Prices
Aigua--Preus
35 p.
ECO-SOS, Centre de Recerca en Economia i Sostenibilitat
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia; 2021-01
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