Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya
Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtiques
Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs
2019-11-01
The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-60555-4_11
Many power indices on simple games have been defined trying to measure, under different points of view, the “a priori” importance of a voter in a collective binary voting scenario. A unified probabilistic way to define some of these power indices is considered in this paper. We show that six well-known power indices are obtained under such a probabilistic approach. Moreover, some new power indices can naturally be obtained in this way.
Peer Reviewed
Postprint (author's final draft)
Part of book or chapter of book
English
Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs; Game theory; Decision making -- Mathematical models; Voting -- Mathematical models; Simple games; Power indices; Probabilistic models; Jocs, Teoria de; Decisió, Presa de -- Models matemàtics; Vot -- Models matemàtics; Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory; Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91B Mathematical economics
Springer
Lecture Notes in Computer Science (11890)
Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence (11890)
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-662-60555-4
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO//MTM2015-66818-P/ES/ASPECTOS MATEMATICOS, COMPUTACIONALES Y SOCIALES EN CONTEXTOS DE VOTACION Y DE COOPERACION./
Open Access
E-prints [72986]
