Prolegómenos a una ética para la robótica social

Abstract

Social robotics has a high disruptive potential, for it expands the field of application of intelligent technology to practical contexts of a relational nature. Due to their capacity to “intersubjectively” interact with people, social robots can take over new roles in our daily activities, multiplying the ethical implications of intelligent robotics. In this paper, we offer some preliminary considerations for the ethical reflection on social robotics, so that to clarify how to correctly orient the critical-normative thinking in this arduous task. We defend the ‘being perspective’ and its linked categories of ‘teleology’ and ‘interest’ as the ones from which to articulate the reflection. We argue that attending primarily to the robots’ ‘being’, before their ‘doing’, allows us to correctly approach the core phenomenon of all ethical concerns on social robotics (the outsourcing of our agency in these entities), avoiding the reductionisms in the ethical gaze to which the latter may lead.

Peer Reviewed

Postprint (published version)