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Empirical evidence on tax cooperation between sub-central administrations [WP-IEB]
Durán Cabré, José María; Esteller Moré, Alejandro; Salvadori, Luca
The literature on horizontal tax interdependence pays limited attention to interactions in administrative policies, although they can play a large role in determining the amount of tax revenues collected. We investigate the incentives for sub-central tax authority cooperation in a decentralized context, with the aim of identifying the determinants of that cooperation. Our results are congruent with standard theory; in particular, the existence of reciprocity is essential for sharing tax information, but there is sluggishness in this process, which is partly the result of the short-sighted behaviour of tax authorities influenced by budget constraints. Hence, this is good news for the functioning of a decentralized tax administration, as in the medium-long run the gains to be made from sharing tax information are achieved.
-Política fiscal
-Impostos
-Reforma fiscal
-Fiscal policy
-Taxation
-Tax reform
cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Durán Cabré et al., 2015
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
Working Paper
Institut d’Economia de Barcelona
         

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