Ascertaining whether local election results are driven by incumbents’performance while in office or mechanically reflect constituencies’ ideological affiliation and macroeconomic conditions is crucial for evaluating the alleged accountability-enhancing property of decentralization. Based on a unique score of urban environmental performance and the results of all elections held in the major Italian cities over a decade, we investigate the role of local (fiscal and environmental) versus national issues in municipal elections. While the empirical evidence points to a strong ideological attachment and a somewhat weaker fiscal conservatism, it reveals that media reported environmental ranking has a considerable impact on the popularity of city governments.
English
Eleccions locals; Dret fiscal; Anàlisi de dades de panel; Dret ambiental; Local elections; Tax law; Panel analysis; Environmental law
Institut d’Economia de Barcelona
Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions
IEB Working Paper 2011/18
[WP E-IEB11/18]
cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Bianchini et al., 2011
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/