A procedure to compute the nucleolus of the assignment game

Publication date

2017-12-19T09:00:07Z

2017-12-19T09:00:07Z

2013-11

2017-12-19T09:00:07Z

Abstract

The assignment game introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1972) is a model for a two-sided market where there is an exchange of indivisible goods for money and buyers or sellers demand or supply exactly one unit of the goods. We give a procedure to compute the nucleolus of any assignment game, based on the distribution of equal amounts to the agents, until the game is reduced to fewer agents.

Document Type

Article


Accepted version

Language

English

Publisher

Elsevier B.V.

Related items

Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2013.09.005

Operations Research Letters, 2013, vol. 41, num. 6, p. 675-678

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2013.09.005

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(c) Elsevier B.V., 2013

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