dc.contributor.author
Cubel, Maria
dc.contributor.author
Sánchez-Pagés, Santiago
dc.date.issued
2018-06-08T16:24:32Z
dc.date.issued
2019-05-31T05:10:12Z
dc.date.issued
2018-06-08T16:24:33Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/122877
dc.description.abstract
This article explores the existence and endogeneity of gender differences in strategic behaviour. We report results from two experimental studies employing the beauty contest game, one in the laboratory and one in the classroom. We observe robust and significant gender differences in observed depth of strategic reasoning in favour of men in zero‐stake situations. These differences disappear when a monetary prize is awarded. We also find that females engage in more rounds of reasoning than males when gender and stereotypes are made salient. This effect of priming is driven by females who believe women are superior in the game.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.relation
Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12488
dc.relation
Economic Journal, 2017, vol. 127, num. 601, p. 728-756
dc.relation
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12488
dc.rights
(c) Royal Economic Society, 2017
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)
dc.subject
Estudis de gènere
dc.subject
Igualtat de gènere
dc.subject
Gender studies
dc.subject
Gender equality
dc.title
Gender Differences and Stereotypes in Strategic Reasoning
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
