Voting behaviour under doubts of ballot secrecy: reinforcing dominant party rule

Abstract

Ballot secrecy is a cornerstone of electoral democracy, since its real or perceived absence can make voters reluctant to express their true preferences. Through survey data from Singapore, we show that doubts over ballot secrecy can alter voting behavior even when the vote is secret and there are no individually-targeted punishments or incentives. We estimate such doubts cause 3-5% of Singaporean voters to support the dominant party despite a preference for the opposition. We also examine individual-level correlates of doubting ballot secrecy: a tendency towards belief in conspiracies and distrust of the mass media are the strongest predictors. Finally, we use counterfactual election results to show the consequences of these doubts: they consistently secure the dominant party additional parliamentary seats, thereby buttressing dominant party rule over the long term without resorting to overtly repressive measures that can attract domestic and international condemnation.