dc.contributor.author
Calleja, Pere
dc.contributor.author
Llerena Garrés, Francesc
dc.contributor.author
Sudhölter, Peter
dc.date.issued
2024-06-17T00:36:53Z
dc.date.issued
2023-09-01
dc.date.issued
2024-06-17T00:36:58Z
dc.date.issued
info:eu-repo/date/embargoEnd/2026-08-31
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/213281
dc.description.abstract
In this note, we investigate the relationship between non-manipulability via merging (splitting) and strong non-manipulability via merging (splitting). Our analysis reveals that while these two non-manipulability axioms are generally not equivalent, they do coincide when the principle of solidarity is satisfied. This principle is fulfilled by a wide range of bankruptcy rules, including parametric rules.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
Elsevier B.V.
dc.relation
Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.07.004
dc.relation
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2023, vol. 125, p. 61-64
dc.relation
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.07.004
dc.rights
cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2023
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
dc.source
Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)
dc.subject
Anàlisi vectorial
dc.subject
Vector analysis
dc.title
Remarks on solidarity in bankruptcy problems when agents merge or split
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
