dc.contributor.author
Funaki, Yukihiko
dc.contributor.author
Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)
dc.date.issued
2025-02-13T08:37:37Z
dc.date.issued
2024-12-01
dc.date.issued
2025-02-13T08:37:37Z
dc.date.issued
info:eu-repo/date/embargoEnd/2027-10-28
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/218727
dc.description.abstract
This article reviews some contributions on cooperative games where the Journal of Mathematical Economics has been influential, namely the games with non-transferable utility and some market games with indivisibilities. Additionally, it presents some more recent advances on two aspects of the theory of cooperative games: the introduction of externalities in the worth of the coalitions and the axiomatic characterization of solutions.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
Elsevier B.V.
dc.relation
Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103064
dc.relation
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2024, vol. 115
dc.relation
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103064
dc.rights
cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2024
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
dc.source
Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)
dc.subject
Teoria de jocs
dc.subject
Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
dc.subject
Externalitats (Economia)
dc.subject
Cooperative games (Mathematics)
dc.subject
Externalities (Economics)
dc.title
Some advances in cooperative game theory: indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
