Para acceder a los documentos con el texto completo, por favor, siga el siguiente enlace: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/115898
Título:
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Tax limits and local democracy
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Autor/a:
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Revelli, Federico
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Notas:
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Based on a theoretical model where state limits on local government policy elicit a move from private value (position issue) to common value (valence issue) voting, I exploit exogenous variation in tax limitation rules in over 7,000 Italian municipalities during the 2000s to show that fiscal restraints provoke a fall in voter turnout and number of mayor candidates, and a rise in elected mayors’ valence proxy and win margins. The evidence is compatible with the hypothesis of hierarchical tax limitations fading the ideological stakes of local elections and favoring valence-based party line crossing, thus questioning the influential accountability postulate of the fiscal decentralization lore. |
Materia(s):
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-Administració fiscal -Eleccions locals -Descentralització administrativa -Tax administration and procedure -Local elections -Decentralization in government |
Derechos:
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cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Revelli, 2013
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
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Tipo de documento:
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Documento de trabajo |
Editor:
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Institut d’Economia de Barcelona
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Compartir:
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