Vote buying or (political) business (cycles) as usual?

Author

Aidt, Toke

Asatryan, Zareh

Badalyan, Lusine

Heinemann, Friedrich

Publication date

2017-09-14T12:07:32Z

2017-09-14T12:07:32Z

2015

Abstract

We study the short-run effect of elections on monetary aggregates in a sample of 85 low and middle income democracies (1975-2009). We find an increase in the growth rate of M1 during election months of about one tenth of a standard deviation. A similar effect can neither be detected in established OECD democracies nor in other months. The effect is larger in democracies with many poor and uneducated voters, and in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and in East-Asia and the Pacific. We argue that the election month monetary expansion is related to systemic vote buying which requires significant amounts of cash to be disbursed right before elections. The finely timed increase in M1 is consistent with this; is inconsistent with a monetary cycle aimed at creating an election time boom; and it cannot be, fully, accounted for by alternative explanations.

Document Type

Working document

Language

English

Subjects and keywords

Cicles econòmics; Vot; Política monetària; Business cicles; Voting; Monetary policy

Publisher

Institut d’Economia de Barcelona

Related items

Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions

IEB Working Paper 2015/23

[WP E-IEB15/23]

Rights

cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Aidt et al., 2015

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/

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