Vote buying or (political) business (cycles) as usual?

dc.contributor.author
Aidt, Toke
dc.contributor.author
Asatryan, Zareh
dc.contributor.author
Badalyan, Lusine
dc.contributor.author
Heinemann, Friedrich
dc.date.issued
2017-09-14T12:07:32Z
dc.date.issued
2017-09-14T12:07:32Z
dc.date.issued
2015
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/115378
dc.description.abstract
We study the short-run effect of elections on monetary aggregates in a sample of 85 low and middle income democracies (1975-2009). We find an increase in the growth rate of M1 during election months of about one tenth of a standard deviation. A similar effect can neither be detected in established OECD democracies nor in other months. The effect is larger in democracies with many poor and uneducated voters, and in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and in East-Asia and the Pacific. We argue that the election month monetary expansion is related to systemic vote buying which requires significant amounts of cash to be disbursed right before elections. The finely timed increase in M1 is consistent with this; is inconsistent with a monetary cycle aimed at creating an election time boom; and it cannot be, fully, accounted for by alternative explanations.
dc.format
53 p.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.language
eng
dc.publisher
Institut d’Economia de Barcelona
dc.relation
Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions
dc.relation
IEB Working Paper 2015/23
dc.relation
[WP E-IEB15/23]
dc.rights
cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Aidt et al., 2015
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers
dc.subject
Cicles econòmics
dc.subject
Vot
dc.subject
Política monetària
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Business cicles
dc.subject
Voting
dc.subject
Monetary policy
dc.title
Vote buying or (political) business (cycles) as usual?
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper


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