Some advances in cooperative game theory: indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach

Fecha de publicación

2025-02-13T08:37:37Z

2024-12-01

2025-02-13T08:37:37Z

info:eu-repo/date/embargoEnd/2027-10-28

Resumen

This article reviews some contributions on cooperative games where the Journal of Mathematical Economics has been influential, namely the games with non-transferable utility and some market games with indivisibilities. Additionally, it presents some more recent advances on two aspects of the theory of cooperative games: the introduction of externalities in the worth of the coalitions and the axiomatic characterization of solutions.

Tipo de documento

Artículo


Versión aceptada

Lengua

Inglés

Publicado por

Elsevier B.V.

Documentos relacionados

Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103064

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2024, vol. 115

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103064

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Derechos

cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2024

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

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